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Calling for Recognition:  
Ethnic Grievances and Terrorism in Xinjiang, China
Abstract 
One of the most debated aspect of puzzles in the study of the escalation of homegrown terrorism is 
why ethnic grievances can stimulate the activation process in terrorist groups. As the most 
representative origin of China’s homegrown terrorism, the unharmonious factors in ethnic relations 
of Xinjiang, primarily between the Uyghur people and the Han Chinese, are worth considering. 
Past literature has comprehensively discussed the causes of the Uyghur groups’ grievances, but few 
studies have paid enough attention to the way they influence the increase in terrorist activities. 
Based on the framework of the social movement (SM) theory, this thesis develops an analysis 
explaining that three different categories of reasons caused the growth of the local terrorist groups 
in recent years through triggering ethnic grievances in different ways. It concludes that bad ethnic 
relations and cultural disintegration, resources mobilizing structure, and changes in the political 
opportunity structure jointly create opportunities for the upgrade of terrorist threats. 
Introduction 
 In many people’ mind, compared to Western states who are struck by probably the most 
intractable global issue—terrorism, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) used to be kept off “the 
radar of the international jihadist movement” (Potter, 2013). However, “On 2 Oct. 2013, a car 
crashed and exploded in the most politically sensitive place and Beijing’s symbol—Tiananmen 
Square, leading to the death of five people” (Branigan, 2013). Soon afterwards the suspects arrested 
on suspicion of conspiring in the attack were all identified as people belonging to the Uyghur group, 
which swiftly turned people’s attention to the Uyghur community, a Turkic ethnic group with Islam 
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belief living almost exclusively in southwest Xinjiang. Historically, the Uyghur groups in Xinjiang 
do not have traceable cultural connection to the Han Chinese, the overwhelming majority of China’s 
population, rather, the Uyghur terrorists seek independence from China since 1990s and was named 
as the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) in the counter-terrorism actions 
implemented by the Chinese government. However, it is worth noting that the Uyghur terrorists’ 
narratives have greatly changed in the recent years from the original calls for solely political 
autonomy and the preservation of Uyghur cultural and religious customs to the ambition of building 
an Uyghur nation state with independent political regime. As Cornelison stresses, the current 
terrorists forces in Xinjiang no longer belong to the ETIM and instead act as the Turkestan Islamic 
Party (TIP) who “has called or the liberation of ‘East Turkestan’ from ‘infidel Chinese Communist 
invaders’ and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate” (Cornelison, 2015, p. 31).  
 Consequently, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, mainly inhabited by the Uyghur 
people, became the most prominent origin of China’s homegrown terrorism. According to a volume 
of past literatures, the geographic significance of Xinjiang is undeniable, which highlights the 
urgency of its terrorism issue. Mackinder’s “Heartland theory” (Mackinder, 1904) initially revealed 
its geopolitical significance in a theoretical level: “the core of Euro-Asia” (See Figure 1). Recently, 
Xinjiang has become one of the two cores of the “One Belt, One Road Initiative”, the so-called 
“China’s Marshall Plan” (Curran, 2016). Therefore, some scholars predict that if the ethnic tensions 
and the terrorist issue in the Western minority region cannot be mitigated properly, Xinjiang may 
become the “Achilles Heel of China’s rise” (Godbole, 2009).  
 Although first launched in the 1990s along with the emergence of terrorism, China’s 
counter-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang is remarked as “a struggle that had been going on for years 
but only recently gained significant notoriety” (Wong, 2003, p.3). For more than 15 years, “China 
has sought to manage its domestic terrorism problem through a strategy that rests on three pillars: 
(1) enhanced regional economic growth, (2) stronger internal security capabilities; and (3) deepened 
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controls over ethnic and religious activities” (CNA, 2016, p.3). Externally, the principals initially 
published in the Counter-terrorism Agreement of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security 
organization established by China and its Central Asian neighbors centers on regional security-
related concerns, also revealed China’s purpose to strengthen international cooperation with 
neighbor countries. Regarding the legislative measures, the first comprehensive counter-terrorism 
law was published on 27th. December 2015, which officially includes counter-terrorism into the 
national security strategy of China. It deals with the issues including “terrorism designation and 
prevention, intelligence gathering, emergency response, safeguards, legal liabilities” (Zhou, 2016) 
and etc., as a guideline for the implementation at each level. Four specific aspects need to be 
highlighted in Zhou’s opinion: “China’s definition of terrorism; obligating technology companies to 
provide technical support for counter-terrorism purposes; placing restrictions on the reporting of 
terrorist attacks and government responses; and implementing a ‘people’s war on terrorism’” (Zhou, 
2016). Afterwards, in the operational level, the counter-terrorism leadership organs at national level 
was established in charge of the general coordination and legislation enforcement. “The regular 
meetings were held between the counter-terrorism leadership organs and local police and security 
department aiming at strengthening the and continuity of the counter-terrorism work” (周栋梁&张
铮, 2015).  
 Aside from the general legislation, other measures were exercised in Xinjiang such as 
“simulating the local economy, promoting the sinicization of education and “strengthening the 
monitoring system” (王茜&李吉和, 2015). Promoting local economy is the primary measure 
implemented by China’s central government. For example, nineteen provinces and cities in the East 
Coast of China, a relative prosperous region, have been assigned to provide aid to the poor areas in 
Xinjiang. However, measures in strengthening cultural integration turned out to be less effective 
because “while other Muslim minorities (like the Hui) exist in China, the Uyghur people have 
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traditionally resisted full assimilation into majority Han Chinese culture more than similarly 
situated minorities” (Mizzi, 2017). After many years’ efforts, the race relations in Xinjiang, which is 
believed to be the fundamental and direct motivating factor of terrorism, ; while instead, the 
growing Uyghur’s grievances in Xinjiang provided suitable environment for the spreading of 
radical ideas and the organizing of terrorist attacks. This paper will find out the relation of local 
ethnic violence and conflicts and escalation of terrorism in Xinjiang, specifically on the simulation 
of the Uyghur group’s grievances on the local terrorist activities, under the framework of social 
movement theory. It follows the result of past research on the ethnic causes of terrorism and argues 
that theses causes stimulate local terrorism through triggering grievances in a dynamic way. 
 The remaining part of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, I review the past literature and 
research to discuss how ethnic grievances and terrorism might be connected theoretically and what 
empirical studies have found about the ethnic motivation to the development of terrorist forces. 
Particularly, I found that the discussion on the transformation of ethnic grievances to the escalation 
of terrorist activities in Xinjiang suffers from a lack of research. I then develop the hypotheses that 
draw on the social movement theory mainly developed by Alimi et. al (2015), present analysis 
regarding the activation of different categories of causes to the local terrorist groups through 
triggering ethnic grievances. The following section details my analysis by presenting relevant data 
and findings. The final section summarizes the analysis and draws conclusions for future research 
as well as for conflict prevention and resolution. 
Literature Review 
 Much of the literature theoretically connects ethnic factors and variables to terrorism. This 
section reviews the past research on the relation of terrorism and ethnic violence, aiming at studying 
how terrorism emerged and developed in Xinjiang as one type of ethnic violence. This section also 
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summarizes the literature on explaining the domestic causes that promote the transformation of 
ethnic grievances to the stimulation of terrorism, with an emphasis on political and economic 
perspectives, the two most concerned dimensions in the terrorism study of Xinjiang. The review is 
far from exhaustive or solely targeted on Xinjiang, but it tries to discuss the theories and relevant 
empirical observations of similar regions in the rest of the world to formulate the hypothesis tested 
in the next section. 
Why Should Ethnic Violence Affect Terrorism? 
 This thesis is based on the assumption that terrorism can be one type of ethnic violence. 
Many scholars have supported this proposition in their literature and research. In some research, on 
a macro level, terrorism is linked to the variables that may cause ethnic civil wars or armed 
conflicts: it is more likely to emerge “in the presence of excluded and concentrated ethnic 
groups” (Arva & Piazza, 2016; Choi & Piazza, 2016; Ezcurra, 2017) and “ethnically diverse 
countries” (Basuchoudhary & Shughart, 2010; Piazza, 2008). Empirical measurements like the 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (ELF) index and ethno-linguistic polarization are also widely 
applied to analyze the link of ethnic variables and terrorism. On a more micro level, an empirical 
test conducted by Nemeth, Mauslein and Stapley (2014) concluded that “number of minority groups 
and their diversities only matters in domestic countries”. On the basis of this, Python, Brandsch and 
Tskhay (2017) further proposed the most updated research result on the connection between 
ethnicity and terrorism, who added that, aside from the universally acknowledged aim of provoking 
the government,  “ethnic terrorists have a second potential target for provocation, the opposing 
ethnic group”(Brandsch & Tskhay, 2017, p.87). In this regard, inciting ethnic variables and violence 
between ethnic groups might be a predictor of ethnic grievances driven terrorism. 
 The study object of this thesis—terrorism in Xinjiang—is an extreme performances of 
ethnic conflicts. In the category of terrorism proposed by Bigo and Bonelli (2007), terrorism in 
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Xinjiang is in the camp of “separatist terrorism (ethnical, regionalist, nationalist or independantist)”. 
Thus “China’s current counter-terrorism policies is exactly based on the assumption that Uyghur 
terrorism is an upgrade of ethnic violence”(王茜&李吉和, 2015, p.32). Furthermore, the theoretical 
foundation of most other Chinese studies on Uyghur terrorism always lies in ethnic terrorism (彭清, 
2014; 都永浩&左岫仙, 2017; 许尔才&张建军, 2011; 郝时远, 2002).  
What Caused the Transformation of Ethnic Violence to Terrorism? 
 Domestic factors that raised ethnic conflicts were studied in past literature. In the case of 
Xinjiang, many past research is applicable, specifically on the dimensions of political and economic 
environment. According to the revenant research, these factors led to ethnic violence and eventually, 
on the basis of literature and theory discussed before, caused escalation of terrorism. 
Politicized Ethnicity  
 A group of related literature and empirical research apply Wimmer’s theory of ethno-
nationalist exclusion (Wimmer, 2002) to measure ethnic armed conflicts resulting from non-
cohesion. Almost all of them hold that exclusion along ethnic lines, especially of powerful minority 
groups, increases the likelihood of ethnicity-based terrorism. Qualitative studies stress that “the 
state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclusion that generates 
these conflicts in the first place” (Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1994; Wimmer, 2002; Cederman et al., 
2010, p.89). Based on this, the literature regarding the exclusion theory mostly underlines the 
importance of politicized ethnicity in activating armed conflicts. Meeting the logic of 
ethnonationalist conflict, a basic consensus has been reached in the past few decades. Opinions are 
divided on how and when political exclusion results in the emergence of terrorist groups; however, 
all of the literature admits that, because of data limitations, the current study is far from the final 
word on ethnicity’s influence on terrorism. 
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 This study is organized around several propositions, stated below. In the context of 
politicized ethnicity, a group of scholars emphasizes that ethnic structure plays a main role in 
transforming grievances into violent behaviors. A representative discussion can be found in the 
African research of Basedau et al. (2011), who suggest “the role of certain demographic religious 
structures that are conflict-prone”. Scholars (Buhaug et al., 2008) also study ethnic groups’ 
characteristics to explain their violent behaviors. More specifically, their findings on the links 
between geographic position and conflict escalation provide a sample for the study of Xinjiang. 
Another great volume of literature considers political inequality as an important factor. Cederman et 
al. (2010) explain the association of exclusion and competition along ethnic lines with internal 
conflict from the political side. The highly related relationships between ethnic and religious 
diversity and the likelihood of conflict imply that ethnic conflicts are more likely to happen in 
places “where the dominant group is a demographic minority: The more [that] demographically 
significant ethnic groups are excluded from state power, the more likely it is that there will be 
violent attempts at overcoming such imbalance” (Cederman & Girardin, 2007).  Recent empirical 
research (Cederman et al., 2009; Wimmer et al., 2009; as sited in Cederman et al., 2010) offers 
support for the exclusion theory and holds that the probability of ethnic conflicts increases with the 
demographic power of the politically marginalized group. 
Economic indices 
 Another major focus presented in much of the past literature is the local economy’s effect. 
Research from a great volume of literature regarding terrorism demonstrates that poverty is the most 
debated object in discussions about deteriorating ethnic relations (Berrebi, 2007). The disparity in 
living conditions of the Uyghur residents when compared to the local Han Chinese or residents in 
other areas, particularly when we use many variables like income, education and unemployment, 
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tends to be one of the primary causes of of minorities’ discontent and makes violent escalation more 
likely.  
 The major proposition regarding economic causes arises from three factors. The first factor 
that activates the transformation of grievances to terrorist activities is “the income gap between the 
most populous group and one or several other minority groups” (Blomberg et al., 2004). Other 
studies, such as Drakos and Gofas (2006), also consider the income gap as a “statistically 
significant predictor of ethnic conflicts”. However, many subsequent research studies hold the 
opposite opinions. For example, Berrebi (2007) finds “both higher standards of living and higher 
levels of education are positively associated with participation in Islamic Jihad”. The disputes about 
the link between a minority’s income and grievances-caused terrorism remain but, more 
importantly, there is insufficient evidence to claim a corresponding situation in Xinjiang. 
 Additionally, the education level, which directly reflects the level of economic development, 
is emphasized by many policy makers in dealing with disintegration and lack of recognition, but 
their observations are much more pessimistic. Some worldwide research studies in different areas 
cast doubt on the claim that “a well-developed education system can certainly lead to fewer terrorist 
activities” (Brockhoff et al., 2010). But a survey (2014) by an Chinese Uyghur scholar Tursun 
(2014) in Xinjiang shows a different result. She claims that “the low education level among Uyghur 
youth in South Xinjiang creates social instability and facilitates the recruitment by terrorist 
organizations” (Tursun, 2014). We can, thus, find micro-level evidence in Xinjiang that suggests its 
education level is negatively associated in the short term with the ethnic grievances that can cause 
participation in terrorist activities. 
 Moreover, regarding unemployment, another frequently discussed variable, most scholars 
have not yet reached a consensus on its direct effect on ethnic, emotion-based terrorism. Most 
literature on this topic commonly assumes that “the unemployment rate is associated with income, 
in other words, improvement of local economy” (Sambanis, 2004; Caruso & Gavrilova, 2012). 
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However, when compared to other income indicators, “the unemployment rate can more directly 
measure the degree of relative deprivation that is a cause of economic grievances” (Gurr, 1970). In 
other words, unemployment can be considered as the most significant and direct generator of ethnic 
grievances. However, insufficient proof exists to verify that unequal, employment-produced 
grievances will certainly be associated with violent activities.  
Theoretical Framework 
 Based on the brief literature review, combined with the specificities of Xinjiang, we can 
conclude that ethnic grievances truly stimulate terrorist activities and the escalation of terrorist 
groups within Xinjiang, but the actual process of the stimulation remains undiscussed. Past 
literature and research usually measure the influence of ethnicity on conflicts by capturing the 
country-level causes, namely insufficient political participation and unequal economic 
development. Thus, many ethnic causes of terrorism have been explored, few have applied a 
conceptual framework that can contribute to the study of the dynamic process of terrorism 
stimulation. This thesis, based on the social movement theory, will analyze that from the 
perspectives of terrorist groups to compensate for that gap. Thus, by developing an organization-
oriented analysis, we can understand why and how a direct stimulation of local terrorist activities 
exists. 
 The creator and successors of the social movement theory primarily applied it to understand 
the origins, dynamics, and outcomes of political movements, while some scholars (McAdam et al., 
1998; Oberschall, 2004; Beck, 2008; Alimi et. al, 2015) subsequently proposed its applicability to 
terrorism studies. The main reason that the terrorism issue can be analyzed under the framework of 
the social movement theory is that, on the basis of “common definitional elements of terrorism” 
defined by many scholars (Gibbs, 1989; Hoffman, 1999; Bergesen, 2007; Schmid, 1982; Goodwin, 
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2006), “it is appropriate to view terrorism as one form of contentious politics” (Beck, 2008, p.
1576). Tilly (2004) also supported this discourse by defining terrorism as a “tactic” in his work, 
namely “a type of contention that may or may not appear in a political struggle” (Beck, 2008). 
According to the introduction before, terrorist groups in Xinjiang is a analyzable form of 
contentious politics with political claims that originated from political conflicts. In this view, the 
social movement theory can provide a tool for researching the outcomes of Xinjiang’s ethnic 
grievances at the domestic security level. 
 In the study by Alimi et al. (2015), “the escalation of terrorist groups is activated by many 
causes and motivations that have already been discovered by some scholars which can be 
categorized into the rooted conditions, facilitative causes and precipitating events”. 
Additionally, McAdam et al. (1998) proposed the “3-fold framework of theoretical perspectives: 
mobilizing resources, political opportunities, and framing” to explain the emergence of social 
movements. In analysis, this thesis adopts the strategic interaction-oriented analysis approach that 
considers participation in terrorist activities a dynamic process unfolding during the interaction of 
ethnic emotions and terrorist ideologies under specific political environment. This approach is 
developed by Alimi et al. (2015) in the relational perspective that “posits the interactions (i.e., 
contacts, ties, exchange of information, bargaining, mediation, negotiation, etc.) between actors or 
parties in certain events as a ‘sub-mechanism’ that is further constituting the attribution of threat 
among minorities and movement organizations  to our understand the process of radicalization”. 
This paper examines the stimulation of terrorism by discussing the main actors and their 
engagement (eg. strategic planning, decision, and choice) in political violence. 
This thesis further explain this with three dimensions in the background of Xinjiang, 
including resources, mobilization and political opportunity structure. Having combined the already 
mentioned perspectives, the remainder of this thesis analyzes the three categories of stimulating 
causes on the local terrorist activities. The following discussion studies the triggering resources, 
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namely the ethnic grievances, as the rooted conditions, the mobilizing structure as the facilitative 
causes, and the political opportunity structure as the precipitating event. This leads us to the 
following three main hypotheses that are to be tested:  
Hypotheses 1: Low level of ethnic economic and cultural integration leads to escalation of 
  terrorism. 
Hypotheses 2: Resources mobilizing structure facilitates development of terrorist forces.  
Hypotheses 3: Political opportunity structure emerged in certain period upgrades the impact 
  of Uyghur terrorism.
Methodology 
 This thesis applies the approach of qualitative analysis. The sources of data are reports, news 
and past studies carried out by scholars in relevant field. In the following discussion, it adopts the 
approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Van Dijk, 2015). Van Dijk (2015) devises a 
theoretical framework based on the concepts of CDA, which will firstly “bridge the societal macro-
micro gap” (Van Dijk, 2015, p.468) through analyzing the interaction of minority individuals and 
terrorist groups; and demonstrate “social power of groups or institutions” (Van Dijk, 2015, p.469) 
through examining the consequences of power control imposed by the dominant Han group and 
terrorist organizations to the Uyghur group.  
Concepts and Operationalization 
 On the basis of the previously-introduced theoretical framework, the key concepts 
constructing the objects in this thesis are: ethnic grievances; activation of terrorism; counter-
terrorism policies (development policies; ethnic policies; security policies); the failure of 
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integration; and political opportunity. Ethnic grievances and the failure of integration are the key 
research objects of this thesis. Ethnic grievances is rooted in the failure of integration of nation 
states and directly reflects the effects of state’s ethnic policies on improving the race relations. The 
concept of social integration is difficult to be visualized, it can be reflected by the economic and 
educational statues of minority groups. The Uyghur people’s grievances towards other groups, 
primarily the Han Chinese charging the main power of the state, are embodied in the sense of 
economic inequality, indicated by the economy-based factors like employment and poverty rate, and 
cultural disintegration, indicated by social-based factors like the education level and the feeling of 
belongingness. Activation of terrorism, in this thesis, is mainly derived from Uyghur people’s ethnic 
grievances and measured by the number of ethnic hatred-driven violate activities and the scale and 
influences of terrorist groups in a certain period of time. China’s counter-terrorism policies are 
reflected in the newly published counter-terrorism law, its local development and security 
(preventative) policies and a series of governmental documents. Combined with its consistent ethnic 
policies, the effects of the counter-terrorism policies can be evaluated in several criterions: regional 
economy, religious recognition, the ethnic groups’ political rights, the influence of overseas 
extremists, propaganda and media exposure. The first three dimensions are the most worthy to 
consider in the following discussion.  Lastly, the concept of political opportunity refers to the 
special opportunity for terrorism to prosper, which is created by the national development strategies 
and policies toward certain historical events. 
Ethnic Grievances as the Rooted Conditions of Xinjiang Terrorism 
 No movements can survive without enough resources and supporters. The social movement 
(SM) theory, according to Alimi et. al (2015), considers ethnic grievances and resources, namely the 
“rooted conditions”, as the first main cause that promotes the escalation of terrorist groups’ 
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violence. Regarding the case of Xinjiang, the “rooted conditions” (Alimi et al., 2015) can be further 
divided into economic grievances and ideological grievances that are jointly activated by the 
development policies, the security system and, most importantly, the ethnic and cultural policies 
used to cope with the ever-growing terrorist forces. Thus, led by bad ethnic relations and a low level 
of integration, ethnic grievances as the main resources serve to escalate terrorist groups’ violence. 
 On the one hand, the Uyghur’s “economic grievances” (Reed & Raschke, 2010) towards the 
Han Chinese and government should be considered as the main ideological resources of Xinjiang’s 
homegrown terrorism. It is caused, firstly, by the long-existing economic disintegration and failure 
of local economic development policies to improve the living standard of the Uyghur people, the 
original residents in this region. After all, “competition for state resources is seen as a matter 
concerning not just individuals or associations of shared interests, but rather whole ethnic 
groups” (Wimmer, 2002, p.103). As already introduced above, the counter-terrorism law and most 
of the official papers of the central government consider promoting local economic development as 
Xinjiang’s top mission. In fact, the current overall economic performance of Xinjiang is much better 
than many other provinces (see Figure 1) due to its benefitting from the exploitation of West China: 
“…among 31 administrative units in China, Xinjiang ranked 18th in terms of GDP per capita in 
2012” (Lee, 2014, p.5). Based just on the provincial-level statistics Lee provided (2014), we see that 
Xinjiang's socioeconomic condition is closer to the average group’s level rather than the group that 
lagged behind. As a result, economic inequality appears to have been raised by the “intra-provincial 
variance” (Lee, 2014), namely, the disparity between the prefectures and the gap between different 
ethnic groups. The data from the empirical tests launched by Tian and Yu (2013) reveal the 
astonishing regional inequality between northern and southern Xinjiang: “…northern Xnijiang has 
only 1/3 of [the] land area and 54% [of the] population but its fixed asset investment accounts [for] 
74.8%, GDP accounts [for] 76%, and industrial production accounts [for] 78.8%” (Tian and Yu, 
2013; translated by Lee, 2014, p.6). All these data reveal that the average living conditions in 
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northern Xinjiang, where the majority of Han immigrants reside, are much better than in southern 
Xinjiang, where the population of the Uyghur exceeds the Han Chinese. More importantly, southern 
Xinjiang, particular in Kashgar and Hotan, is also where the recent terrorist attacks are mostly 
concentrated. Thus, we can conclude that even though the recent stimulative policies have brought 
much improvement to Xinjiang’s overall economy, “economic performance may not work as is 
expected” (Yin, 2017, p.41; 彭清, 2014) in decreasing “economic grievance” (Reed & Raschke, 
2010); instead, the Chinese government has not properly solved the rooted contradiction among 
minority groups—resources allocation (Wimmer, 2002). The huge flood of immigrants, stimulated 
by the policies that boost the economy, conversely decreases the employment rate of the local 
Uyghur people, the group originally targeted by the incentive policies. The definition of terrorism 
proposed by Kydd and Walter (2006) revealed its nature of low costs, risk and military influence: 
“deliberate targeting of civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals”. Thus, being in a 
relative weaker position, the Uyghur’s ethnic grievances from living in poor areas can be easily 
triggered to fuel resistance activities. When compared to protests and rebellion, which are harshly 
forbidden by Chinese law, terrorist attacks became a preferable option due to their smaller costs and 
greater impact and influence for the Uyghur living in the economically backward regions. 
 On the other hand, the Uyghurs’ ideological grievances towards the Han Chinese are also 
becoming more impactive in the last few years. In Xinjiang, the Uyghur’s appeals at the national 
level and the nature of their appeals are ignored during the counter-terrorism implementation. 
Firstly, the Uyghur groups’ appeals have been overlooked to some extent due to the unequal 
political opportunity among the diverse minority groups. Observation reveals that, when compared 
to the Uyghur group, other ethnic minorities who are also living inside Xinjiang have received 
better political treatment from the national government. In fact, other minority groups occupy a 
much smaller portion of Xinjiang’s total population: “in addition to 10.74  million Uyghurs and 8.6 
million Han Chinese, there were also approximately 1.59 million Kazak, 1.05 million Hui, 0.2 
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million Kirgiz, 0.18 million Mongols, and 0.04 million Xibo living in Xinjiang in the year of 
2013” (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2014). In political sphere, “since these ethnic minorities are 
outnumbered by the Uyghur, they are not willing to see an independent Xinjiang/East Turkistan that 
is dominated by the latter” (Wang, 2007, p.263-264). To assure political support from these smaller 
ethnic groups inside this region, the Chinese government has chosen to utilize their natural concerns 
towards the Uyghur, which are particularly triggered by the recent violence on the common citizens, 
by implementing an actual unfair distribution of “political resources”, such as the right of 
delegation. Moreover, to better govern the region and maintain the Han authority’s supreme status, 
the Kazak, Hui, Kirgiz and Mongols have been given autonomous prefectures, despite not being the 
most populous ethnic groups in the corresponding areas. The result of these uneven treatments of 
different minorities is obvious, and the opinions and emotions of the Uyghur, although ranked as the 
most populous minority group, are overlooked in many past cases. Hence, there is reason to believe 
that the government’s intentional or unintentional ignorance of the Uyghur’s appeals encourage 
them turn to other means of expression, and the local Islamic organization is an obvious choice. 
Secondly, the spirits of the terrorist groups is more convincing with the sense of unification within 
the minorities that are triggered by the repressive policies.. As stated earlier, the Uyghur’s 
grievances towards the Han Chinese and government are the main ideological resources of 
Xinjiang’s homegrown terrorism. It also appears to serve as a reason for the escalation of terrorist 
groups, because the ideology and spirits of the terrorist groups who are under cultural and religious 
repression can be more convincing. It is commonly acknowledged that “terrorist organizations 
spend much time and effort in justifying and explaining their actions” (Beck, 2008, p.1570). But 
things are simpler for participants in the Uyghur’s terrorism: the ideology that the terrorists wish to 
spread can be more convincing if combined with the religious background and through 
organizations like the previously mentioned underground Islamic schools. Moreover, the national 
spirits of the minorities that are triggered by the central government’s repressive policies, prompt 
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people’s trust in those Muslim-operated organizations. The economic and political appeals, which 
have been analyzed in the past literature, will not be discussed in detail here; instead, the following 
analysis focuses on the Uyghur’s ideological appeals, namely the appeals for recognition. In fact, 
the ideological appeals of the Uyghur group cannot be explained with a single perspective. These 
appeals can be categorized into two aspects, based on their nature: the inner identification or sense 
of unification among the whole Uyghur group and the external recognition of national identity for 
both the group and its individuals. 
 It is understandable that the sense of unification or ethnic identity among the whole group 
can be easily triggered by the repressive policies or unfair treatment. Many reasons can be provided 
to prove that an strong inner identification within a minority group is crucial for the escalation of 
terrorist groups. According to McAdam et al.’s (1998) theory, the organization of terrorist groups 
can be explained by the idea of “framing”, which also refers to the process of 
“frame alignment” (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow et al., 1986) in other literatures. That is, namely, 
“the justifications and appeals movements use to mobilize support” (Beck, 2008, p.1569). In this 
regard, the appeals of both the Uyghur and the founded terrorist organizations are framing the 
terrorists’ actions in the process of obtaining support and popularity. The Uyghur groups’ appeals 
are understandable, but in Beck’s (2008) opinion, the inner identification can also be explained as a 
collective identity that can be explained by the cultural perspective of the “new social movement 
process” (Sutton & Vertigans, 2006): “collective identity is important for understanding how 
contention is sustained in the absence of formal organizations”  (Beck, 2008, p.1571). Gurr also 
proposes that “mobilization depends on the availability of collective identities, shared motivations, 
capacities, and opportunities for collective action” (Gurr, 2000, p.60). Thus, some of the Uyghur 
people in Xinjiang may have a strong collective identity as well as a shared motivation to improve 
their political and economic treatment, but they probably lack sufficient capacities and opportunities 
to mobilize and organize a collective action with mass participation. “From a rational point of view, 
 17
M.S.c International Organization Thesis, Weishan Liu, s1892363
it is much more feasible, much less costly, and relatively more effective to conduct terrorist attacks, 
particularly when the dissidents are living under a strictly controlled society”(Yin, 2017, p.60). 
Morever, in this regard, recognition is equally important even for the individual terrorists. 
Conversely, Beck also proposes that “a movement approach could stress terrorism as a method 
for creating and maintaining a collective identity” (Beck, 2008, p.1571), which means the 
successful launching of terrorist attacks will further strengthen the collective identity. However, 
some scholars have pointed out that “the Uyghurs are not necessarily united as Muslims” (Steele 
and Kuo, 2007, p.11), and they doubt the power of the Uyghurs’ collective ethnic identity. Like the 
categories of the Islamic groups in the rest of the world, the Uyghur as a group are actually 
fractured. In fact, there are two competing factions within the Uyghur communities: the Sufi and 
non-Sufi, with “age-old territorial loyalties and linguistic discrepancies” (Mackerras, 2005, p.8). 
Additionally, as Millward proposed, many victims of these terrorist attacks have been the innocent 
Uyghur residents, rather than the commonly acknowledged targeted symbols of PRC 
authority” (Millward, 2004). Hence, “while numbers are obviously difficult to come by, anecdotal 
reports from journalists, international rights organizations and researchers appear to confirm that the 
majority of Uyghurs favour non-violent protests and perhaps autonomy over separation” (Steele & 
Kuo, 2007, p.11). However, the inner cleavages inside the Uyghur groups will actually further 
foster the resentment and existence of violent Islamist elements. As a whole, the identity of the 
Uyghur as a representative outcome of ideological appeals will make the organization of terrorist 
groups more convenient.  
Resources Mobilizing Structure as the Facilitative Causes  
 On the basis of the rooted grievances and resources, the mobilizing structure also provided 
space for the emergence of terrorism according to the social movement theory. McAdam and Scott’s 
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(2005) research asserts the significance of resource mobilization, “rather than stressing common 
grievances, SM theorists focused attention on mechanisms of mobilization and opportunities to seek 
redress” (McAdam & Scott, 2005, p.6). In other words, the successful transformation of grievances 
into the motivation for terrorist activities relies heavily on the phase of resource mobilization. In the 
traditional ideas of mobilization, a successful ethnic mobilization depends on grassroots support, 
namely the aggrieved populations who can provide the necessary material resources and labor as 
internal support. From the theoretical perspective, McCarthy and Zald (1977) explain the terrorist 
groups’ mobilization process within the framework of resource mobilization. According to their 
theory, “social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed 
beneficiaries” but “conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major 
sources of support”. Conscience constituents, a phenomenon in terrorist activities that usually 
occurs in states or regions that are economically highly developed, are people who support a 
movement even though they might not directly benefit from it. Currently, considering that there is 
still a large gap between the overall status in Xinjiang and the necessary condition that determines 
the emergence of conscience constituents, the escalation of terrorist groups inside this region still 
heavily relies on the Uyghur people’s negative ethnic emotions towards the government and other 
groups. 
However, with the failure of the Uyghurs’ cultural integration into the Han communities, as 
analyzed before, the social network inside the Uyghur communities provided a material foundation 
for the resources mobilization and the recruitment of participants for terrorism. McAdam’s political 
process model (1982) clearly stresses “the importance of social network connections in the 
terrorism-oriented resources mobilization and the successful recruitment of participants and 
supporters” (McAdam, 1982), which is also applicable to the case of Xinjiang, where recruitment 
usually happens in the relative implosive areas inhabited by the Uyghur groups. According to 
McAdam’s theory, “every individual is embedded in different organizations or association based 
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social networks or private relationships that is very likely to form a kind of conflicting behavioral 
pressures” (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993). The close ties founded on the inherent social network 
within the Uyghur communities thus became a feasible approach to recruitment. Micro-level data 
collected by Yin (2017) on the individual features of terrorists in Xinjiang also show that terrorist 
attacks are more likely to be carried out by local perpetrators (see Figure 2). Although the data are 
selected from a small part of the terrorist organizers, the scholar still concludes that the performers 
of terrorist attacks do “have a preference to target places where they have more associations” (Yin, 
2017, p.56). Thus, the social network inside the Uyghur communities in Xinjiang not only 
accelerates the spreading of those terrorist organizations’ influence, but it also increases the 
occurrence of terrorist activities in the Uyghur-concentrated regions. This phenomenon can be 
observed more with the emergence of  “underground Islamic Schools”, which the next section 
discusses in detail. However, a weakness still exists in this conclusion, because the effective 
transformation rate of the personal social network to the available resources for recruitment remains 
questionable for lack of relevant data and covered facts by the Chinese government.  
Successful mobilization is only the beginning for a series of successful terrorist activities for 
violent terrorist groups; a suitable external environment also plays a equally significant role in the 
escalation of local terrorism. As some scholars have stressed, “movements arise not only because 
they are able to successfully mobilize resources, but because overall political or social conditions 
are ripe for successful and sustained contention” (Beck, 2008, p.1568). Beck further adds that 
regarding terrorism, the conditions are usually created under the “repression by governments, such 
as the use of physical violence or intimidation by police and clandestine services” (Beck, 2008, p.
1572), which is a noteworthy outcome that can be seen from the content of China’s counter-
terrorism law and policies, as previously introduced. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
grassroots political environment in Xinjiang and the implementation of counter-terrorism policies 
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targeted to the Uyghur groups jointly create a suitable space for the emergence and successful 
campaigns of terrorist groups within this region.
Firstly, the inefficiency and low prestige of the local grassroots organizations provided 
enough opportunities for terrorist groups to grow. The political process theory of McAdam (1982) is 
also applicable here for examining the external environment intentionally or unintentionally created 
by the local authorities and their counter-terrorism policies. McAdam’s (1982) political process 
theory stresses the importance of appropriate political conditions: “the emergence of most social 
movements benefited from the combination of both political opportunities and the organizational 
capacity”. In Xinjiang’s case, the grassroots organizations as the main actors in policy 
implementation, no matter the counter-terrorism policies or other conventional policies, directly 
determine the local Uyghurs’ impressions and attitudes towards the Han Chinese, who are actually 
in fully charge of the decision-making process. Compared to other provinces, the efficiency of 
the local grassroots organizations in Xinjiang is an intractable issue because of its ethnic and 
religious structure (minorities exceed the Han Chinese), relatively independent political position (an 
autonomous region), and terrorist history. The insufficient implementation of local development 
policy particularly results in educational deficiencies caused by the unsolved financial difficulties in 
remote areas, which brings a large amount of jobless people with low education levels and 
resources for terrorist recruitment. As an important fraction of China’s non-military counter-
terrorism measures, although building a strong grassroots organization has always been in the top 
priority of the regional development work in the village, “its actual efficiency still remains 
questionable” (王茜&李吉和, 2015, p.31). On the other side, regarding the case of Xinjiang, there 
is enough evidence to show that those “underground” Islamic schools are an important actor during 
the recruitment of regional terrorist groups. “Evidence shows that violent actions in the aftermath of 
China’s new counterterrorism policy are usually spontaneous acts initiated by religious preachers 
and followers of ‘underground’ Islamic schools” (Morin, 2017). The massive rise of those 
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underground Islamic schools is partially obscured because, apart from its historical origin and 
overseas power influences, in China, “authorities have placed draconian restrictions on the 
traditional cultural, religious and linguistic practices of ethno-religious minority groups” (Famularo, 
2015). As a result, with the growing need for scriptures study stimulated by the recent rise in 
religious members among the Uyghur population (see figure 3), a remarkable phenomenon 
emerged: the flourishing of underground Islamic schools. The harsh restrictions on religious 
activities, having lasted for several decades, undoubtedly turned people to those growing 
underground organizations, which are operated by people who seem to be more trusted and 
beneficial for the common Uyghur residents. As Lee (2014) highlighted in his report, “these 
unofficial religious organizations are very capable to attract followers and build mobilizing power 
through underground religious preaching”. This does not mean that the participants in those 
unofficial religious organizations are exposed to the radical and separatist ideas and will join in the 
launching of terrorist attacks, but their ever-expanding scale will certainly provide a foundation for 
terrorist groups to inculcate the terrorist ideology and even foster the potential execution of violent 
attacks. The inefficiency of local grassroots organizations further pushes this process. Based on this, 
the local grassroots organizations lose people’s trust and further yield the actual ruling rights to 
those underground religious organizations. Thus, we can conclude that the low efficiency and 
prestige of the local grassroots organizations provided an encouraging external 
environment for recruiting and expanding the terrorist and extremist groups. However, there are 
other powerful actors who can assist the desperate Uyghur people, including local authorities, such 
as the NGOs, the media, and so forth. In this regard, the underground Islamic schools may not be 
the only choice for them under such situation so that the increasing number of terrorist activities 
should not be fully blamed on the low efficiency and prestige of the local grassroots organizations.
 Secondly, the repression imposed by the counter-terrorism policies of the central 
government, especially security policies such as the long-standing monitoring system, has raised the 
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Uyghur’s  distrust and hatred towards the Han Chinese-controlled government and further propelled 
the transformation of some Uyghur to become potential radical terrorists. Georgetown Security 
Studies Review’s columnist, Shannon Mizzi, thinks that “the longstanding political, cultural, and 
religious repression of Xinjiang’s Uyghur ethnic minority will only serve to make China’s terrorism 
problem worse, and may have created it in the first place” (Mizzi, 2017). According to the 
previously introduced counter-terrorism law, the broad monitoring project targeting at the Uyghur 
groups is criticized as unreasonable, for it has raised the greatest human rights concerns around the 
world. For example, one of the most controversial policies in the newest Counter-terrorism Law 
(2015) is that the Chinese government obliges technology companies to provide technical support 
and decryption by providing so-called “backdoor provisions” for the prevention and investigation of 
terrorist activities. This article also restricts the rights of media and social media to report on the 
details of terror attacks that might lead to imitation or show scenes that are “cruel and inhuman” to 
the society. Western media strongly criticized this provision by stressing that freedom of the press is 
not only a fundamental human right but also a major foundation of democracy; moreover, they 
expressed their concerns for the capability of emergency responses for other common citizens when 
there is not enough awareness of the hidden threats. Nevertheless, China is known for maintaining a 
powerful censorship apparatus for sensitive topics. Thus, in practice, the local monitoring system is 
also expanding. “Political leaders are also implementing a number of new programs aiming at 
enabling the local authorities to verify the identities and track the digital footprint of individuals 
online” (Famularo, 2015). A prominent wave of resistance activities happened after the bloody riots 
on 5 July, 2009, when the “Internet access in the region was cut off in the wake of the riot to prevent 
violent crimes from happening again” (Cao, 2014). All of the facts mentioned here can prove that 
the various repressive policies on the whole Uyghur community buries suspicions in people’s minds 
and “inflames matters, provoking anger among the Uyghur people, and creating fertile soil for 
further religious extremism” (Lee, 2015). Despite the economic indicators mentioned before, we 
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can easily conclude that Xinjiang’s minorities, especially the Uyghur, appear to suffer from some 
“systemic discrimination” (Steele & Kuo,  2007, p.12) only because of their unique ethnic identity 
rather than any other criteria such as crime records. These policies have, thus, given many Uyghur 
reasons to believe that the Chinese central government imposes a salient threat to their basic rights, 
cultural and religious viability, and so forth. Having realized that there exists broad disintegration 
and discrimination ranging from the culture to personal rights, the common Uyghur residents can 
hardly build a sense of trusts and belongingness on the Han Chinese ruling authorities, especially 
when they are the key actor in exercising the monitoring system. However, cultural disintegration 
can only be considered as one aspect of the impetus for the Uyghur to support the local extremist 
forces in that, for most of the common residents, especially people living in poorer conditions and 
relatively closed regions, a more peaceful way is much better than exercising unpredictable violent 
attacks that might do harm to their own benefits. Thus, further observation is needed to fully explain 
the relationship between cultural disintegration and the escalation of terrorist groups. 
The Changes in the Political Opportunity Structure in 2008-2009 Were the Precipitating 
Events 
 The year 2008 marked a historical change in China’s developing path since the start of the 
21st century. The 2008 Olympic Games “confers an opportunity for the Chinese people to raise 
their confidence in their country as a civilized host of a major international event” (Chen et al., 
2010, p.120). As the host country, China went through a turning point in its domestic ethnic issues 
and international status. Those factors further caused a survival crisis in the Uyghurs’ culture.  On 
the one hand, the Olympic Games strengthened the overall national identity of the whole country, 
mainly represented by the Han Chinese identity, and an increased sense of alienation for minority 
groups; on the other hand, the games greatly improved China's international statues and attracted 
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global concerns that provided terrorist groups a chance to improve their national influences. 
Impacted by the unsolved ethnic contradictions and the Chinese government’s policies promoting 
Han culture, a survival crisis in the Uyghur culture finally broke out after 2008. These changes 
jointly performed as the “precipitating events”  (Alimi et al., 2015) of the escalation of terrorist 
forces. 
 The long-standing and hidden trouble in China’s ethnic policies thus broke out, highlighting 
its questionable human rights record in the world, and “the combination of demonstrators desperate 
for the world's attention and the heightened nationalism of Chinese citizens makes for an extremely 
combustible situation” (Economy & Segal, 2008, p.55). However, China tend to impose the 
spearhead of the responsibility of the increasing terrorist violences to the foreign forces or 
organizations, in order to avoid the essential problems existed its ethnic policies. As revealed in the 
earlier introduction, the effective counter-terrorism actions of Chinese government mainly rely on 
harsh policies on the suspected Uyghur communities; and this tendency becomes more prominent 
after 2008. There is record showing that the monitoring system is upgraded after this “turning 
point”: “The process of increasing cameras has accelerated following the 2008-2009 unrest in 
ethnographic Xinjiang, imposing increased monitoring on the religious activities in the mosque and 
schools” (Famularo, 2015). In comparison, the Uyghur group’s external appeal—the outside 
recognition of their national identity—has not received enough attention from the Chinese 
government ever since the founding of Xinjiang province. In other words, the state-level 
recognition of their national identity as the main appeal for the common Uyghur people, while 
actually ignored by the Chinese government’s cultural and religious policies for counter-terrorism, 
may be utilized by terrorist groups. Accordingly, cultural recognition as a main appeal for the 
common Uyghur people can be utilized by both the Chinese government and the terrorists; 
however, some of them are already inclined to the latter due to the government’s ignorance of the 
importance of promoting their integration in the cultural and religious levels.  
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 Secondly, the promotion of China's international status attracted increasing concerns around 
the globe; thus, it was a good timing for terrorists and extremists to generate public opinion and 
boost their terrorist forces. In fact, activists like the Tibetan demonstrators saw the chance to 
express their long-standing political dissents. In their minds, also in many foreign media’s ideas, 
“the Olympics highlight the yawning gap between the very attractive face that Beijing presents to 
the world and the much uglier political reality at home” (Economy & Segal, 2008, p.50). Ignoring 
the appeals of the terrorist groups, however, the Chinese government responded to the domestic 
security threats “with a traditional mix of intimidation, imprisonment, and violent 
repression” (Economy & Segal, 2008, p.50). These measures further deteriorated the tensions in 
ethnic relationships. Additionally, the nature of social movement determines that the ignorance of 
terrorist groups’ appeals usually leads to a much worse outcome. In Beck’s study, 
radicalization centers not only on the repression by the state’s side but also on “the 
movement cycles” (Beck, 2008). In this regard, there is an organizational life cycle in the social 
movement that is applicable to the terrorism research in Xinjiang. Koopmans’s (1993) findings 
express a similar opinion: “…social movements might become more radical with failure of 
achieving their initial goals since firstly founded” (Koopmans, 1993). As introduced earlier, in fact, 
the initial target of Xinjiang’s terrorist groups indeed underwent a drastic change compared to few 
decades before. According to McAdam (1983), who argues that “movements must continually 
innovate new tactics as governments and counter-movements adapt to previous modes of 
contention” (McAdam, 1983; Beck, 2008, p.1573), the ever-changing appeals of terrorist groups 
themselves are continuously generating new motivations for further activities. As a result, and as 
previously proposed, the actual transformation of the Uyghur extremists’ initial goals also promoted 
the process of radicalization and the continuous emergence of new forms of terrorist actions. 
 In addition to the Olympic Games, the Chinese government’s decision to promote the Han 
cultural  renaissance unintentionally prompted a survival crisis of Uyghur culture in Xinjiang. The 
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most prominent measure of the renaissance plan was that several Han traditional festivals have been 
included in the national official holidays since 2008, which is undoubtedly a threat to the Xinjiang’s 
Uyghur culture. As discussed earlier, the cultural integration in Xinjiang have not been successful 
due to the harsh ethnic and cultural policies on the Uyghur groups. Under such conditions, a 
compulsory implementation of the Han culture outputs became a source of grievances and 
eventually provided ideological support for the terrorist groups’ activities in seeking cultural 
recognition and independence. However, this is solely one of the many factual motivating factors 
that turns the grievances to the violent expression in terrorist means, while the substantial culprit 
still buried in the unsolved ethnic inequality problem. 
Conclusion 
There is much debate as to what actually constitutes the activation of terrorism in Xinjiang’s 
Uyghur Autonomous Region. On the basis of the national law, the Chinese government have 
launched comprehensive policies, ranging from the economy to the culture, to counter the terrorist 
groups inside this region. However, in fact, the policies’ weaknesses and some misinterpretations 
still remain during the enforcement process at the local level, which causes grievances and distrust 
in the Uyghur group. 
To understand how the Uyghur’s grievances stimulate homegrown terrorism in Xinjiang, 
this thesis adopted the social movement theory (SM) to explain the transformation of ethnic 
grievances to terrorism from the perspectives of resources mobilization, political environment and 
the organization of local terrorist groups. 
More specifically, the rooted grievances and resources generated from it provides sufficient 
ideological and material resources for terrorist groups. The ideological resources of terrorist groups 
are raised by the Uyghur’s grievances towards the Chinese government and the Han Chinese.  since 
ignorance of the Uyghur groups’ appeals at the national level can turn them into a violent type of 
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expression. The appeals discussed here are not the traditional economic or cultural ones but the 
recognition of the ethnic identity, both inside and outside the group. Moreover, the mobilizing 
structure of Xinjiang terrorist forces creates enough surviving space for those terrorist 
organizations. This is because, firstly, the failure of cultural integration into the Han communities 
makes the social network inside the Uyghur community a material foundation for the mobilization 
and the recruitment of participants in terrorism; secondly, the local grassroots organizations’ 
inefficiency and low prestige and the Uyghur people’s distrust and hatred towards the government, 
which is caused by the cultural repressive policies in the Chinese government’s counter-terrorism 
implementations, especially the security policies and monitoring system, jointly provides suitable 
political environment for mobilization and recruitment of terrorist groups. Last but not the least, the 
political opportunity structure in the period of 2008-2009, represented by the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics Games and the Han culture renaissance policies, result in the escalation of Uyghur 
terrorism in a large scale. Having taken all these into consideration, the most practical suggestion 
for the Chinese government to decrease the influence of the Uyghurs’ grievances on the escalation 
of terrorist groups is to actively promote their cultural and religious recognition rather than the 
harsher exercises of the repressive policies. This can improve ethnic relations, change the political 
environment, and better satisfy the appeals of local Uyghur people. 
The arguments of this thesis are based on the facts and data released by the Chinese 
government, but in view of its harsh control over the information sources, some figures will 
probably remains covered or unreported. However, the final conclusion of this study will not be 
changed due to the volume of figures. The discussions formulated in this thesis are selected from 
the representative events in the case of Xinjiang; the facts and figures presented in it are not 
exhaustive but try to remark on all the possible causes and effects regarding the issue. Furthermore, 
since the terrorist issue in Xinjiang and China’s countermeasures are still in a developing phase, 
further research should be done into the ever-changing situations.  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Figure 1  Map of Mackinder’s “Heartland” Theory  
Source: “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904) 
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Figure 2 Data on the Individual Features of Terrorists in Xinjiang 
Source: Report: “Unrest in Xinjiang, Uyghur Province in China” (2014) 
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Figure 3  Data on the Individual Features of Terrorists in Xinjiang 
Source: “Rooted in Poverty?: The Political Economy of Terrorism in Xinjiang” (2017) 
Figure 4 Number of Mosques in Xinjiang Since 1949  
Source: “Report: Unrest in Xinjiang, Uyghur Province in China” (2014)  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